The Drug Fight in Mexico: Failure Is Not an Option

By Roger F. Noriega.

AEI Online, Friday, May 14, 2010   A PDF versioncan be seen here:  http://www.aei.org/docLib/no2LAO2010g.pdf

No. 2, May 2010 As President Barack Obama receives Mexican president Felipe Calderón in Washington, D.C., this month, the two leaders must focus urgently on the shared responsibility of defending their people from the deadly drug trade that operates across the U.S.-Mexico border. At a time when the United States debates how best to respond to the drug-related crime and illegal immigration that are the products of an insecure border, Americans should consider the disastrous consequences that might occur should Mexico fail in its current offensive against the gangsters who thrive on the illegal cross-border traffic in drugs, cash, guns, and humans. Although Congress approved funding to support Mexico’s efforts under the Mérida Initiative in 2007, only a fraction of the assistance has been delivered. Any serious strategy for dealing with the porous border and drug-related crime in the United States must include more decisive and effective assistance for the Mexicans living on the front lines of this dangerous campaign.

Key points in this Outlook:

Drug-related violence threatens both the United States and Mexico, and both countries must meet their responsibilities to confront the illegal drug trade.

In addition to strong political backing, specialized law-enforcement assistance to Mexico is needed, but the United States has been slow to deliver this aid; the government has spent only a fraction of the funds the U.S. Congress pledged for the fight.
Mexican president Felipe Calderón is battling the drug cartels and gangs, but the fight has led to an increase in violence; recent polls show his offensive may be losing popular support.

The stakes are high for Mexico; failure in fighting the drug cartels could cause irreparable damage to Mexico’s fragile democracy.

Arizona’s new immigration law has ignited debate around the country, but the law is a response to the impact of drug-related criminality on the security and well-being of the American people. Arizona residents are grasping for solutions to a surge in violent crime–including three hundred to four hundred kidnappings in Phoenix in each of the last two years–that can be traced back to the drug gangs that operate across the U.S.-Mexico border. Rather than criticize border states for their desperate response, Washington policymakers must do more to fulfill the federal government’s fundamental responsibility to secure the nation’s borders and battle the transnational threat of drug trafficking. Although conventional wisdom might dismiss the chances for bipartisan cooperation in this election year, Obama and leaders in Congress from both parties have every reason to work together to help Mexico in its critical struggle against savage gangs responsible for spiraling crime and violence and the flood of deadly drugs into the United States. The arguments for urgent bipartisan cooperation are compelling:

Unless the United States redoubles its efforts to help Mexico deal a decisive blow to this transnational threat, drug trafficking is likely to come back with a vengeance with consequences on both sides of the border.

Mexican president Felipe Calderón has welcomed unprecedented U.S. support, and it is especially important to cement effective cross-border coopera-tion in light of the possibility that Calderón’s party will suffer losses in the July 2012 presidential and congressional elections.

Stalwart, bipartisan support from the United States–which should recognize its shared responsibility in this fight–may bolster Mexico’s bold reforms aimed at building a more effective state and a just society.

The United States would benefit from a more stable and prosperous Mexico, which could be a stronger partner in an increasingly competitive world.

Despite many months of negative news and a spike in violence, with specialized U.S. support, Mexico is improving its internal capacity to plan and wage a smarter offensive.

Failure is not an option: if Mexico falters, the United States will bear the unthinkable costs of increased illegal immigration and unchecked drug trafficking that will result from instability in Mexico. This Is Our Fight, Too It is easy for some critics to look at Mexico and write it off as an out-of-control foreign country or suggest insulating U.S. communities from the drug-related violence by “shutting down the border.” These facile responses are less valid today than ever; they ignore three key ties between the United States and Mexico and the bold leadership in that country that deserves U.S. support. First, Mexico is our third-largest trading partner, behind Canada and China.[1] The U.S.-Mexico border economy is one of the most dynamic and integrated economies in the world. Millions of jobs in both countries depend on the $280 billion in goods that flow through ports of entry along the three-thousand-mile border. Substantial communities sitting astride the border depend on 250 million legal border crossings each year.[2] Although both governments can–and must–do more to choke off illegal immigration and illicit cargo moving in both directions, attempting to wall out drug violence from Mexico is a hopeless strategy.

Second, U.S. demand for illegal narcotics fuels the criminality in Mexico. A few years ago, it might have been fair to accuse Mexico’s one-party state of complicity in the drug trade or to blame that government for refusing to cooperate with the United States in confronting criminal gangs, but that criticism is unfair today. Calderón has deployed extraordinary resources against the criminal narcotics trade, and U.S. law enforcement officials have been astonished by Mexico’s determination to cooperate with the United States and to improve its capacity to sustain the fight. Although the United States has increased its programs to suppress the consumption of cocaine, methamphetamine, marijuana, and other drugs, drug trafficking to U.S. consumers still wreaks havoc in Mexico. Mexican academic and former foreign secretary Jorge Castaneda explains, “Mexico puts up the bodies, the boots on the ground, and the money, and Mexico lives with the violent consequences of an American dilemma.”[3] Third, the drug-trafficking organizations that Mexico is battling also operate north of its border. These groups are in league with nearly 1 million U.S. gang members, who distribute drugs in twenty-five hundred U.S. communities.

According to the U.S. Department of Justice’s National Drug Threat Assessment 2010, “Mexican DTOs [drug-trafficking organizations] continue to represent the single greatest drug trafficking threat to the United States . . . [and they] are gaining even greater strength.”[4] So, it is impractical to suggest that we can ignore the trouble south of the border. It is immoral to say that Mexico should fend for itself in fighting a fire that is fueled in large part by drug abusers in this country. And it is naive to think that the flames will not jump the fence. The Mérida Initiative: The Least We Can Do President George W. Bush and his Mexican counterpart conceived of the Mérida Initiative, a groundbreaking antidrug cooperation, at a summit in the Yucatan city of Mérida in October 2007. The U.S. Congress approved $1.12 billion to support Mexico’s efforts to disrupt organized crime, strengthen the rule of law and human rights, modernize the border, and promote a “culture of lawfulness.”

In December 2009, the U.S. Government Accountability Office reported that only $24 million (just 2 percent) of the Mérida money had been spent.[5] State Department officials cite congressional preconditions, Mexico’s institutional weaknesses, and the long lead time on acquiring big-ticket items, such as helicopters, for slowing the delivery of aid. As of late March 2010, about 10 percent of the funds had been spent.[6] The plan encompasses U.S. training and equipment, but the most significant “deliverables” are enhanced trust between antidrug authorities in both countries and the gradual improvement of Mexico’s own capacity to plan and execute a sustainable strategy against criminal organizations that are constantly adapting to meet new threats or capture new markets. As officials from both countries see kingpins arrested, killed, or extradited, trust between the two countries grows and fosters even greater cooperation that makes them each more effective in confronting this transnational threat. For example, thus far this year, Mexico has extradited more than one hundred drug traffickers to the United States–already exceeding the record-breaking ninety-five extraditions in 2008.

Bilateral cooperation was critical in two major U.S. operations in February 2010, and October 2009, which led to the arrest of two thousand Mexican gang members operating in the United States.[7] Calderón’s Frontal Assault Calderón won U.S. support at the outset of his administration after demonstrating a strong commitment to confronting the trafficking organizations that have operated with virtual impunity in the drug-trafficking corridors (referred to as “plazas”) in Mexico. Within days of taking office in December 2006, Calderón deployed thousands of army troops to replace ineffective or corrupt police forces in drug-ravaged metropolitan areas. This bold move signaled an end to the de facto “truces” that many Mexican politicians have offered in the past to narcos as a means of minimizing street violence. Some observers say past governments moved beyond truces to actually favoring one cartel over the others–under the theory that making peace with one syndicate that was big enough to keep the others in check was easier than tangling with a host of smaller gangs. Calderón came to office convinced that a genuinely democratic government could no longer turn a blind eye to these criminal syndicates. He recognized that these groups threatened the rule of law in Mexico, and Calderón planned to make rule of law the centerpiece of a modern Mexican state. According to the National Development Plan he issued soon after assuming office, “Narco-trafficking generates insecurity and violence, tears at the social fabric, harms the well-being of the individual, and poses a risk to the physical and mental health of our children and youth. . . . Narco-trafficking challenges the state and presents a serious national security threat.”[8] So, Calderón moved zealously against the six heavily armed gangs that operate in various swaths of Mexican territory.[9] His first target was the La Familia gang in his home state of Michoacán and in neighboring Guerrero, on Mexico’s southern Pacific coast. In the intervening years, he has expanded operations to the northern cities of Tijuana, Ciudad Juárez, and Monterrey.[10]

In addition to engaging the Mexican army, Calderón has relied on specialized marine units to carry out daring arrest raids that require strict operational security. Elements of defense, navy, public security, and attorney general agencies work together in an unprecedented way in antinarcotics operations; the collective budget of these four ministries has been increased by 60 percent to support Calderón’s offensive.[11] His team has also pushed forward to train about seventeen thousand new federal police officers, about half of the intended force. In early April 2010, the first five thousand of these civilian police were deployed in Ciudad Juárez, gradually replacing army units in street patrols. It is clear that his efforts to date have had a significant effect on the cartels, which have been thrown into disarray after losing senior leadership to the unprecedented, sustained offensive by government forces. The leadership of the Beltran-Leyva organization and of the Arellano-Felix organization has been hit hard by the offensive, which has splintered these groups and sparked gang wars for control of organizations and territory.

In an insightful empirical analysis of the drug-related violence in recent years, David A. Shirk writes, “At least in the short term, [Calderón's] strategy appears to have had some success in dismantling organized crime networks. . . . Indeed, there have been disruptions of the top leadership structures of virtually every major [drug trafficking organization].”[12] Shirk reports that about 20,000 deaths are attributed to the violence, which is concentrated in drug-production and trafficking areas; about 90 percent of these deaths were the result of gang-on-gang violence, and about 7 percent of the victims were police officers or soldiers. The number of drug-related murders spiked dramatically in 2008 (5,153) and 2009 (6,587), up from 2,220 deaths recorded in 2007.

A Strategy under Stress: Where Do Mexicans Stand? The dramatic acceleration in the number of killings, coupled with the broader deployment of troops in more communities, has undermined support for Calderón’s policy of confrontation. In a public opinion poll released in February, 50 percent of respondents said Calderón’s drug strategy has made the country “less secure,” while only 20 percent felt the country was more secure; these results demonstrate a sharp decline in public optimism reflected in a similar poll taken about one year earlier. The Mexican government argues that the increase in violence is a sign that the offensive against the cartels is working, but the same poll shows that fewer Mexicans accept this argument. Instead, 47 percent of respondents say the violence is a sign of failure, compared to only 29 percent who agree with the government’s assessment.[13]

The nature of the cartels’ ruthless response has taken more of a toll on the public’s confidence than the sheer number of killings. The patience of a population concerned about economic recovery in addition to the threats posed by the drug war[14] is wearing thin after a four-hour gun battle between Mexican authorities and grenade-tossing narcos, the bloody reprisal against the family of a martyred marine,[15] beheadings, the killing of two innocent students at the prestigious Monterrey Institute of Technology, and brazen attacks on police and prosecutors. The downturn in public support for Calderón’s policy might have been accelerated by his mishandling of a tragic January 31 massacre of fifteen innocent high school and college students attending a birthday party in Ciudad Juárez. Calderón speculated initially that the victims may have been gang members, but the captured triggermen explained that the youths were mistakenly identified as members of a rival gang.[16] At a town meeting in the border city about a week after the massacre, Calderón was confronted by Luz Maria Davila, the grieving mother of two teenaged victims. “Mr. President, I cannot welcome you here,” she said. “We are the living consequences of a war we did not ask for.”[17] That humble factory worker could have been speaking for millions of Mexicans who have grave doubts about the costs of Calderón’s antidrug offensive. In recent public statements and in measures adopted in several border cities, Calderón has begun to stress the federal government’s increased investments in social services intended to improve conditions for Mexicans affected by the economic downturn who are at higher risk for joining street gangs or abusing drugs. The new emphasis is particularly apparent in Ciudad Juárez; this major manufacturing center has lost one hundred thousand jobs as a result of the recession in the U.S. market.[18] “We are not just fighting violence, but the origins of violence,” says Albelardo Prieto Escobar, the agrarian reform secretary, who is responsible for implementing this strategy. The strategy includes programs to create jobs, fight drug addiction, and improve the quality of life.[19] Polls show that Calderón’s National Action Party will likely lose the presidency in the July 2012 elections.[20]

Nonetheless, as Mexico analyst Armand Peschard-Sverdrup of the Center for Strategic and International Studies notes, “drug wars don’t really have an end-date. Mexico is at a critical juncture in consolidating itself as a democracy. The transformation could take three or four presidencies. It’s not something a president can undertake and complete in one term.”[21] In March, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton made the point of traveling to Mexico–along with several other cabinet secretaries–to signal U.S. support. She made strong public commitments to continue to reduce demand for illegal drugs and to stop the flow of illicit cash and firearms to Mexico.[22] Undersecretary for Homeland Security Rand Beers of the directorate for national protection and programs is said to be playing a pivotal behind-the-scenes role, according to a senior Mexican official. At this particularly difficult time, Obama and congressional Republicans (who were among the first to express alarm at the violence in Mexico) should make a conscious effort to demonstrate a strong, bipartisan consensus that the United States will redouble its support. Calderón’s mid-May state visit to Washington presents an opportunity for the administration and Congress to send such a signal to the Mexican people.

What Is at Stake? A Country Worth Fighting For Calderón appears to recognize now–though it may be too late–that he should have done a better job of justifying his crusade against criminal gangs as only part of a broader plan to build a modern Mexico in which the state has the means and the politicians have the motive to apply the rule of law. Under such a vision, the state would be able to collect sufficient revenues to apply the rules of the game without fear or favor; it would be able to break up monopolies, dismantle state-sponsored privilege, make free markets work for the very poor, and engender a more just society. Mexicans have proven themselves capable of extraordinary transformation. The country evolved from a one-party state in which the ruling party’s presidential candidate “won” 100 percent of the vote in 1976[23] to one in which the people accepted–peacefully–Calderón’s razor-thin victory in 2006. It is cynical to assume that the same truces with drug traffickers that were the modus vivendi of politicians in Mexico’s one-party state and backward economy would be tolerable under a democratic government that is striving to be more transparent, accountable, legitimate, and worthy of the public’s trust.

Moreover, since Calderón began his offensive in December 2006, about six hundred Mexican police officers, soldiers, and senior antidrug officials have sacrificed their lives to end the cycle of impunity that discredited Mexican politicians of the past who did not know any better. Today, Mexicans know better. They will understand as Calderón asks them to stay the course to construct a country in which the people can count on a professional police force and independent criminal-justice system to prosecute drug traffickers–and those who murder drug traffickers–as if the country’s life depends on it, because it does.

Roger F. Noriega (rnoriega@aei.org), a senior State Department official from 2001 to 2005, is a visiting fellow at AEI and managing director of Vision Americans LLC, which represents foreign and domestic clients.

You can find this article online at http://www.aei.org/outlook/100957

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